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dividuals' desired outcomes are correlated but not identical. This paper studies col-
lective decisions with private information about these desired policies. Each agent
holds private information which mainly concerns his own bliss point, but this private
information also a®ects all other agents' bliss points. We concentrate on two speci¯c
mechanisms, the mean and the median mechanism. We establish existence of two
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of the corresponding game and compare the per-
formance of the mechanisms for di®erent degrees of interdependencies. Applications
of our framework include the assignment of voting rights in the council of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the design of decision processes in teams, ¯rms, and international
organizations.
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21 Introduction
1.1 Decisions with public values
Many collective decision problems have in common that there is some agreement
between the individuals who are supposed to take decisions as well as some disagree-
ment. Our paper models such situations in an environment of asymmetric infor-
mation by including interdependencies between individual preferences. This means
that the individually preferred decision of a group member does not only depend
on his own private information but also on the other members' private information.
The questions are how the decision mechanism should be designed and how existing
mechanisms perform when individual preferences are correlated.
We consider a speci¯c class of collective decision problems where each of these
has the following properties: In order to take a common decision, all agents obtain
private information (a signal) about their most desired policy. However, no individual
is perfectly informed about what would be the privately optimal policy. This imper-
fection is due to spillover e®ects between the desired policies. The information of all
individuals could be used to calculate the private bliss points whereby each individ-
uals' private information yields more information about its own bliss point than any
other individual's private information. Decision problems are characterized by one
single parameter which measures the extent to which private information a®ects all
individuals.
In this setting we analyze a speci¯c class of mechanisms. Participation is not
voluntary, therefore we can ignore any individual rationality constraints. Moreover,
our mechanisms do not condition monetary transfers on the agents' announcements,
in fact all monetary transfers are ruled out a-priori. Instead, the mechanisms map
individual announcements of the private information into the collective decision.
3We concentrate on two mechanisms, i.e. the median and the mean mechanism.
The median mechanism implements the median announcement, whereas the mean
mechanism implements the average of all announcements. The main di®erence be-
tween these two mechanisms is how they deal with the announcements of private
information. Under the median mechanism changes in extreme positions are dis-
regarded, since the median alone determines the ¯nal decision. On the contrary,
the nature of the mean mechanism is to take all available information into account.
Therefore, under the mean mechanism extreme positions in°uence the decision.
The main result of this paper is the identi¯cation of two symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibria of the respective games. The performance of the mechanisms depends upon
the extent to which spillover e®ects a®ect the economy. With weak interdependen-
cies, the median mechanism dominates the mean mechanism, whereas with strong
interdependencies it is optimal to use the average as decision mechanism.
1.2 Some applications
One can think of a number of di®erent applications of our framework: Any setting
in which the individually preferred decision does not only depend on the agents'
own private information but as well on the signals of the others ¯ts well into this
framework.
One important example may be the decision process in a common central bank
like the European Central Bank (ECB). Here, national central banks may care about
a policy that accommodates macroeconomic shocks in their own country while tak-
ing a collective decision about common monetary policy. However, due to demand
spillover e®ects, shocks in one country may a®ect the desired policy in other partici-
pating countries. Moreover, it is likely that national central bankers have some private
information about their national macroeconomic conditions. If interdependencies are
4strong, the other central bankers' information is very important for the nationally
desired policy. These aspects are the more important the closer any EU-enlargement,
because on this occasion a discussion about structure and organization of the ESCB,
the ECB and its council will become unavoidable to guarantee future functioning.
The existing literature on decision making in this context focuses either on monetary
stabilization policies comparing alternative types of appointees (i.e. having di®erent
mandates) in the ECB council (e.g. Von Hagen and SÄ uppel [1994]), on the implica-
tions of di®erent policy objectives of the common central bank (e.g. Gros and Hefeker
[2000] and GrÄ uner [1999]) or on equilibrium incentive contracts in a multi-principal
agency framework (e.g. Dixit and Jensen [2000]). Instead, we ask how the decision
mechanism of the ECB (in°ation as a function of announced shocks) should be de-
signed in order to maximize the sum of (expected) utilities. Our result translates to
this context in the following way: the larger the common component between member
states, i.e. the more national macroeconomic shocks a®ect all members of the union,
the more weight should be given to extreme positions in the ECB council.
Besides decision making in the ECB council, our setting can be applied for example
to international decisions about environmental policy. Basically, the nation states
a r ei n t e r e s t e di na c h i e v i n gl e s sp o l l u t i o ni nt h e i ro w nc o u n t r y . O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,
they have to take a common decision about certain environmental standards. In
addition, it may be the case that national governments posses private information
about the national amount of emissions, the costs to reduce emissions or the economic
consequences of a reduction. However, the environmental situation in one member
state is co-determined by the emissions in the neighboring countries. The nearer the
location of countries, the more important becomes private information obtained in any
single country. Take as a recent example the negotiations about a common European
standard of reduction in CO2 emissions in preparation for the Kyoto Protocol.
Collective decision problems having the features described above can be found also
5in many areas besides politics. Consider the following example taken from industrial
organization: a decision about the future orientation of a ¯rm has to be made. This
decision has to be taken by the di®erent heads of department. First of all, these
heads are interested in the performance of their own department. Beside this, they
posses speci¯c knowledge about the conditions, needs or prospects of it. However,
their opinion about the future development of the ¯rm is in°uenced by the conditions
obtaining in other departments as well.
1.3 Relation to literature
The mechanism design literature o®ers solutions to related problems, but none to our
speci¯c setting. If there are no spillovers and side-payments are allowed it is always
possible to obtain (Bayesian) incentive-compatibility using an expected externality
mechanism.1 If informational and allocational externalities are considered but mone-
tary transfers are allowed, the problem of e±cient design has been analyzed in auction
environments.2 Instead, we study the case where spillovers are present and monetary
transfers are excluded a priori.
Concerning the analysis of collective decisions, the setting of our paper builds
an intermediate case between two frameworks commonly used in the literature: On
one hand, political outcomes under individual utility maximization are analyzed, i.e.
the case of zero spillovers (see Vaubel and Willet [1991] and the references therein).
On the other hand, the literature deals with e±cient aggregation of perfectly co-
ordinated interests, i.e. 100% spillovers (see Piketty [1999] and the references therein).
Our research focuses on the intermediate case: what kind of political outcomes under
1See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [1995] and Arrow [1979] or D'Aspremont and G¶ erard-Varet
[1979].
2See for example Fieseler, Kittsteiner and Moldovanu [2000] or Jehiel and Moldovanu [1998].
6di®erent information aggregation mechanisms are to be expected if individual interests
are correlated to a certain extend? Thus, we do not analyze political outcomes for a
¯xed degree of spillovers, but instead vary the extent to which individual preferences
in°uence each other.
Related to our work is a recent paper by Casella [2000]. In a similar informational
environment but with private values she proposes a simple voting scheme for delibera-
tions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee
members are allowed to store their vote for future use. Although the scheme cannot
achieve the ¯rst best with more than two voters, making votes storable typically leads
to ex ante welfare gains. Her paper di®ers from ours in that we do not consider devel-
opments over time. Instead, we study a one-shot game excluding also any reputation
e®ects a priori.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model presenting the ¯rst-best solution and the two mechanisms we aim to study.
The respective equilibria under those mechanisms are calculated in Section 3 where
results about the truthful revelation properties of the equilibria are given as well. The
next section compares the performance of the mean and the median mechanism for
di®erent degrees of interdependencies. Section 5 concludes. All omitted proofs can
be found in the Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider an economy which is populated by i =1 ;2;3 individuals. A decision x 2
R has to be taken. Each individual receives private information µi. The parameters µi
are distributed independently and uniformly over the support [¡1;1]. The vector of
private information is µ. An individual's preferences over outcomes are characterized






i describes the individually preferred decision. Individual utility is maximized
at x = µ¤
i (i.e. when the individually preferred decision is actually implemented). The
highest attainable utility is zero. The larger the di®erence between the implemented
policy x and the individually preferred decision µ¤
i, the smaller is individual utility.
The individually preferred policy µ¤
i is a convex combination of i0s type and the
average of all others' types, i.e.
µ
¤






The parameter ® 2 [0; ¹ ®] measures the extent to which interdependencies align the
preferences of all individuals. For the upper bound value ¹ ® := 2
3 all individuals share
a common utility function with a maximum at x = µMean where µMean =
P3
i=1 µi = 3.
F o rt h el o w e rb o u n d® = 0 each individual has his signal µi as a private bliss point.
For example, ® might measure the degree of demand spillover e®ects between the
members of the European Union, closeness of geographical location or the degree to
which ¯rm departments are interlinked.
2.1 Welfare
First, we describe the decision that maximizes welfare, when there are no informa-
tional asymmetries. Welfare is de¯ned as the sum of individual utilities, i.e. we take
an utilitarian perspective to welfare. It turns out that this decision x¤ is independent
of the degree of interdependency ® and is determined by the average of all private
signals.
8Lemma 1 The sum of all utilities is maximized at x¤ = µMean.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is that by summing up the utilities of all individuals
any spillover e®ects are automatically taken into account. Lemma 1 implies that the
mean mechanism would yield the ¯rst best if truth-telling could be implemented for
all degrees of interdependency. However, if informational asymmetries are present,
this ¯rst-best solution remains no longer attainable.
2.2 The mechanisms
We consider the following two direct mechanisms excluding any monetary transfers
and ignoring participation constraints: All individuals are asked for an announcement
^ µi 2 R of their private signal. The vector of announcements is ^ µ. Depending on these
announcements the collective decision x is taken.
The ¯rst mechanism we study is the median mechanism. Let xMedian = xMedian(^ µ): =
^ µMedian,w h e r e^ µMedian is the median of all announcements.3 The median mechanism
implements this announcement and thus replicates majority decisions for the case of
zero spillovers. Another feature of this mechanism is that changes in extreme positions
are disregarded, since the ¯nal decision solely depends on the median announcement.




i=1 ^ µi(µi). This mechanism asks the individuals for their private information and
implements the average of all announcements. Consequently, the mean mechanism
uses all available information and thus extreme positions in°uence the common deci-
sion.
3Let µMedian denote the signal of the median individual. Note that in general µMedian = ^ µMedian
is not true:
93T h e R e s u l t s
In this section, we present two Bayesian Nash equilibria of the games introduced
above, one of the median and one of the mean mechanism. These equilibria imply
truthful revelation for certain degrees of interdependencies.
3.1 Equilibria
Proposition 1 The median mechanism has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.







P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Without loss of generality consider individual 2's best response to linear equilib-
rium strategies ^ µi(µi)=aµi, i =1 ;3. Individual 2 maximizes its expected utility


































in which the announcement of individual 2 is neither the highest nor the lowest
announcement, i.e. ^ µ2 = ^ µMedian. Individual 2's announcement is then implemented





the case in which the announcements of the two other agents are both below the




t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e ya r eb o t h
above, respectively. We analyze these three cases in turn.
Consider ¯rst the situation in which the announcement of individual 2 is the me-
dian announcement. This happens if either ^ µ1 < ^ µ2 < ^ µ3 or ^ µ3 < ^ µ2 < ^ µ1. Since these
two cases are symmetric concerning individual 2's expected utility, assume without
10loss of generality ^ µ1 < ^ µ2 < ^ µ3 and multiply the resulting part of expected utility by





















Next, take the case in which the announcements of both other agents are below
the announcement of individual 2, i.e. if either ^ µ1 < ^ µ3 < ^ µ2 or ^ µ3 < ^ µ1 < ^ µ2. Again,
these two cases are symmetric. Assume without loss of generality ^ µ1 < ^ µ3 < ^ µ2 and





















Finally, consider the situation in which the announcements of the two other agents
are both above the announcement of individual 2, i.e. if either ^ µ2 < ^ µ1 < ^ µ3 or
^ µ2 < ^ µ3 < ^ µ1. These two cases are symmetric as well. Thus, assume without loss
of generality ^ µ2 < ^ µ1 < ^ µ3 and multiply the resulting part by 2. The corresponding































^ µ2 ¡ a
´³
^ µ2 + a
´ 2a^ µ2 ¡ ®^ µ2 +2 ®aµ2 ¡ 2aµ2
2a3 : (7)










11The three solutions to this equation are given by
^ µ2;1 = ¡a;





^ µ2;3 = a:
Note that for announcements ^ µ2 above a and below ¡a expected utility for indi-












. In case of individuals
1 and 3 announcing according to ^ µi(µi)=aµi, the announcement ^ µ2 is never the me-
dian announcement for ^ µ2 >aand ^ µ2 < ¡a. Then, individual 2's expected utility is






























We now return to the three possible equilibria described by (8). Since we are
interested in equilibrium strategies that are linear in µ2 we start the further analysis





which gives the two solutions





12Again, since we are looking for an equilibrium with linear announcement strategies4,
we concentrate on a2 =1¡ 1
2® =: e a. For this speci¯c linear factor two observations
can be made:
(i) e a>0f o r® 2 [0;®]a n d





µ2 for e a and µ2 2 [¡1;1].
It remains to show that ^ µ2;2 indeed yields a maximum of individual announcement
behavior for e a. Consider the ¯rst derivative (7) and de¯ne
f(^ µ2): =





^ µ2 ¡ e a
´³
^ µ2 +e a
´
: (14)
In order to check the second order condition we consider f and g in turn. It holds
that
f(^ µ2;2)=0 ; (15)
f
0(^ µ2)=2 e a ¡ ®>0( 1 6 )


















4Compare also Proposition 2.





















Note that a similar argument shows that ^ µ2;1 and ^ µ2;3 indeed yield minima of indi-
vidual 2's expected utility for e a. The following (simpli¯ed) picture shows individual
2's expected utility as a function of its announcement.
θ2(θ2) ^ E(θ2) ^ -a a (1-1/2D)θ2












is a best reply. Q.E.D.
Under the median mechanism individuals understate their private information.
With increasing degrees of interdependency (larger ®) the private signal becomes
less valuable. Since individuals know that the median of all announcements will be
implemented, they try to pro¯t from the others' information. Their announcement is
14closer to zero than their true signal due to the fact that zero is the expected value of
the information parameters.
Proposition 2 i) There exists a continuum of other symmetric equilibria under the
median mechanism in which all individuals announce the same type irrespective of
their signal, i.e. ^ µi(µi)=e µ 8i. ii) All those equilibria yield lesser expected utility for













8i, because this equilibrium yields at least the same expected payo® than the other
equilibria.
We obtain another linear equilibrium strategy for the mean mechanism. According
to this strategy individuals overstate their private information.
Proposition 3 The mean mechanism has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The equilibrium strategy is ^ µi(µi)=3( 1¡ ®)µi.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Consider individual i's best response to the equilibrium strategy. Individual i
































































































































Using the fact that µj and ^ µj(µj) have an expected value of zero and that expec-













































(¡(1 ¡ ®)µi)=0 ( 2 5 )
and thus,
^ µi(µi)=3( 1¡ ®)µi: (26)
Q.E.D.
16Under the mean mechanism individuals exaggerate their private signal in order
to cancel out the average taking implied by the mean mechanism. With increasing
degrees of interdependency this behavior becomes counterproductive and announce-
ments approach the true signal.5
Although it may seem at ¯rst sight that both equilibrium strategies are indepen-
dent of the underlying distribution of information parameters, this indeed is not the
case and due to the speci¯cation of individual utility.
Using the above calculated equilibrium strategies, it follows that
Corollary 1 The median mechanism has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
which agents announce their type truthfully if ® =0 .
Corollary 2 The mean mechanism has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
which agents announce their type truthfully if ® =®= 2
3.
4 Comparison of mean and median mechanism
We start the comparison by analyzing the properties of the two mechanisms at the
corner values of ®, i.e. at ® =0a n da t® =¹ ®.
Proposition 4 For ® =0the median mechanism yields a better result than the mean
mechanism.
Proof: See Appendix.
We know that individuals reveal their type truthfully for ® = 0 under the median
mechanism (Corollary 1), but not under the mean mechanism. This yields a better
result in terms of payo® than exaggeration as implied by the mean mechanism.
5This result extends to the case of n individuals. Then, the equilibrium strategy under the mean
mechanism is given by ^ µi(µi)=n(1 ¡ ®)µi.
17Note that the median mechanism does not implement the ¯rst-best in general,
since the ¯rst-best would only be implemented if the private information of the median
individual by instance is equal to the average of all types.
Proposition 5 For ® =¹ ® it holds that (i) the mean mechanism yields the ¯rst-best
and (ii) the median mechanism does not yield the ¯rst-best.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows: for ® =¹ ® individuals announce their
type truthfully under the mean mechanism (Corollary 2) and we know already that
the ¯rst-best solution is the average of all types (Lemma 1). This yields part (i).
However, the median mechanism does neither imply truth-telling for ® =¹ ® nor
implement the average. Thus, it does not yield the ¯rst best.
Now, we turn to the behavior of the sum of expected utilities under both mecha-
nisms for intermediate values of ®.
Lemma 2 Consider the median mechanism. The sum of expected utilities is (i)
continuous in ®, (ii) strictly increasing in ® and (iii) attains its maximum at ® =¹ ®.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 3 Consider the mean mechanism. The sum of expected utilities is (i) con-
tinuous in ®; (ii) strictly increasing in ® and (iii) attains its maximum at ® =¹ ®.
Proof: See Appendix.
From Propositions 4 and 5 and Lemmata 2 and 3 we know that there exists an
®1 below which the median yields a better result than the mean mechanism and that
there exists an ®2 above which the mean is better than the median mechanism. Our
main result concerning the comparison between the median and the mean mechanism
shows that these two points coincide, i.e. ®1 = ®2.
18Proposition 6 (i) There exists an ®¤ below which the median is better than the mean







The following picture shows the sum of expected utilities under the mean and the
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If individual preferences are strongly correlated, then making all agents partici-
pate in the decision is better than restricting entry into the decision process. If there
is only a small common component then it is better to use the median mechanism.
The intuition is that for weak interdependencies the equilibrium strategy under the
median mechanism implies announcement behavior close to truth telling whereas the
equilibrium strategy under the mean mechanism leads to strong exaggeration of pri-
vate information. Therefore, average taking is outperformed by ignoring some of the
information available. Since the degree to which ® in°uences untruthful announce-
ment behavior is stronger under the mean mechanism, this intuition holds for a wide
range of interdependencies, only for very high degrees it is reversed.
195C o n c l u s i o n
The problem analyzed in this paper is one of collective decision taking. If the individ-
uals who are supposed to take a common decision are asymmetrically informed and
if there are interdependencies between the individually desired policies, how should a
decision mechanism be designed that maximizes the sum of expected utilities? Our
analysis of this problem concentrates on two speci¯c mechanisms, i.e. the median
and the mean mechanism, and obtains the following: Under the median mechanism
individuals understate their private information, whereas under the mean mechanism
they overstate it. As a result, the median mechanism performs better than the mean
mechanism in terms of expected utility maximization for a wide range of weak in-
terdependencies. Only for very high degrees of interdependency is this mechanism
outperformed by the mean mechanism. The median mechanism replicates decisions
taken by majority rule and this rule can be observed frequently in reality. There-
fore, our results are encouraging because they suggest that the median mechanism is
a good mechanism to take collective decisions - even if there are spillovers between
individually desired policies.
Returning to our primary example, the decision process in a common central bank
like the ECB, we can conclude that decision taking by majority rule (as done in the
ECB council) performs better than taking the average. Disregarding extreme posi-
tions - as does the median mechanism - seems to be favorable as long as participating
countries di®er in the economic conditions they face. Only if the member states expe-
rience a very similar economic environment, it would be better to change the decision
mechanism and use the average of announcements as a common policy.
Starting from our research there are four directions to proceed. The ¯rst extension
is the analysis for larger n. For the mean mechanism all results obtained hold for
n>3, but for the median mechanism this is not obvious. Once there are results
20for the median mechanism as well, one could introduce a class of mechanisms which
relates the outcome to the average of some agents' announcements about their private
information. This class includes the median and the mean mechanism as special cases.
Second, in this paper we abstracted from any individual rationality considerations,
since in many collective decisions participation is not voluntary. However, if we take
participation constraints into account, the traditional solution would prescribe an
outside option to be implemented when an individual opts out. This in turn leads to
changed interim individual behavior and to di®erent equilibrium outcomes - with the
status quo maintaining in many instances. But in our setting - due to interdependent
valuations - even individuals not participating in the mechanism would be a®ected by
the collective decision. This would imply that one has to endogenize the participation
constraint (following Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti [1996]).
Third, in a modi¯ed two-stage game the issue of pre-vote communication may be
analyzed. The question is if an improvement upon the equilibria of the original game
is possible when people are allowed to communicate before they have to vote. It is
well known that equilibrium behavior can be a®ected if agents have the opportunity
to exchange information prior to playing some game (see Crawford and Sobel [1982]).
Our intuition is that such an improvement is not possible in our framework.
Finally, another question we did not address is the design of an optimal mechanism
for the class of collective decision problems studied. This would mean to ¯nd a
mechanism that implements the ¯rst-best for all degrees of spillovers, not only for the
maximum amount.
216 Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:

































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
i) Existence: Assume without loss of generality that individuals 1 and 2 an-
nounce according to ^ µi(µi)=e µ, i =1 ;2. That being so, it is a best reply for individ-
ual 3 to announce e µ as well, since on no account its announcement will change the
implemented decision under the median mechanism.
22ii) If agents announce ^ µi(µi)=( 1¡ 1
2®)µi then xMedian =( 1¡ 1
2®)µMedian: Consider











































































































































































which is true 8 ® 2 [0;®]. Q.E.D.
23P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :



















(µ1 + µ2 + µ3 ¡ µ1)
2 dµ1dµ2dµ3
= ¡2



































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
(i) It su±ces to verify that truthful announcing is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Under the mean mechanism agents announce their type truthfully if ® =®.
Thus xMean = 1
3
P3



























Under the median mechanism expected utility for individual i is given by equation
















P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
Under the median mechanism agents announce ^ µi(µi)=( 1 ¡
1
2®)µi and thus
xMedian =( 1¡ 1
2®)µMedian:


























which is continuous in ®.

























25P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :





































2 +6 ® ¡ 2
which is continuous in ®.
(ii) Monotonicity: Di®erentiating with respect to ® yields
d(E [
Pn
i=1 ¡(xMean ¡ µ¤
i)2])
d®
= ¡9® +6 ( 4 0 )












P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :
(i) From Propositions 4 and 5 and Lemmata 2 and 3 we know that there exists
an ®1 below which the median yields a better result than the mean mechanism and
that there exists an ®2 above which the mean is better than the median mechanism.
It remains to show that ®1 = ®2 =: ®¤. The existence of an unique point of
intersection can be established by comparing the slopes of the sum of expected utility
under the two mechanisms, since both are strictly positive for the relevant range of
26®. Under the median mechanism the slope is given by equation (37) and under the







< ¡9® +6 : (42)
and therefore ®¤ exists.
(ii) The sum of expected utilities under the median mechanism is given by equation
(36) and under the mean mechanism by equation (39). The point of intersection ®¤






























1 > ¹ ® = 2
3, ®¤
2 is the unique point of intersection in the relevant interval,
i.e. in [0;®]. Q.E.D.
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